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Abstract
I study the positive relationship between prices of tradable goods and per-capita income. I develop
a highly tractable general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms and
non-homothetic consumer preferences that outperforms existing frameworks in accounting for the
observed cross-country variation in prices along two key dimensions. The model yields a new
testable prediction that relates prices to measurable variables. I use the prediction to estimate the
price elasticity with respect to per-capita income from unique data featuring prices of 180 identical
goods sold via the Internet in eighteen European countries. The empirical ﬁndings suggest that
variable mark-ups account for a third of observed cross-country variations in prices of tradables.
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International trade has increased considerably over the past decades. Since tradable goods account
for a rising share of consumption bundles of individuals, their prices directly aﬀect consumer
welfare. Consequently, studying the underlying mechanisms that shape the behavior of tradable
consumption-good prices across countries has been a major focus of research in international trade.
One of the most robust empirical ﬁndings in the literature is that prices of tradable consumption
goods are higher in countries that are richer in per-capita terms (see Hsieh and Klenow (2007)
and Alessandria and Kaboski (2011)). In this paper, I argue that variable mark-ups make a key
contribution toward this relationship between prices of tradables and per-capita income. To that
end, I develop a tractable general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous
ﬁrms and non-homothetic preferences over varieties that accounts for the observed variation in
prices across countries with diﬀerent per-capita incomes and sizes. I construct a unique database
of prices of identical goods sold across countries via the Internet and I use it to test the model’s
mechanism against competing alternatives. The model yields a new testable prediction that links
relative prices to measurable variables. I use the prediction to structurally estimate the elasticity
of price with respect to per-capita income and to assess the importance of variable mark-ups in
explaining the observed cross-country variation in prices of tradable consumption goods.
In the model, trade barriers enable monopolistically-competitive ﬁrms with varying productivi-
ties to supply their products at destination-speciﬁc prices. Due to non-homothetic preferences, dif-
ferent per-capita income levels result in diﬀerent consumption sets across countries. Non-constant
expenditure shares yield varying price elasticities of demand for a given positively-consumed vari-
ety across destinations. In particular, rich countries’ consumers are less responsive to price changes
than those of poor ones, so ﬁrms optimally price identical varieties higher in more aﬄuent markets.
Moreover, ﬁrms suﬀer competitive pressures in larger markets and extract lower mark-ups there.
Overall, the model predicts that relative prices of identical varieties are higher in countries where
per-capita income levels are relatively higher and lower in relatively larger countries.
Two alternative frameworks in the international-trade literature link prices of tradable con-
sumption goods to per-capita income via varying demand elasticities. First, Alessandria and Kaboski
(2011) argue that high-wage earners have a high opportunity cost of searching for goods, which
allows ﬁrms to charge high prices for identical goods in rich countries. Unlike the present model,
their mechanism does not link prices to market size. Second, Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) ar-
gue that richer agents consume more per good, which makes them more ﬁnicky and more willing to
pay a high price in order to get closer to consuming their ideal variety. In their model, larger and
richer (in per-capita terms) markets attract more ﬁrms and are consequently more competitive,
which forces ﬁrms to charge lower prices there. Overall, their model predicts that relative prices of
identical varieties are lower in relatively richer (in per-capita terms) and relatively larger markets,
which is in contrast to the present framework.
1I construct a unique database that features prices of 180 identical apparel products sold via
the Internet in eighteen European countries and use it to test the predictions of the three models.
Tracking identical goods enables me to directly measure price discrimination on the basis of varying
demand elasticities in the absence of product-quality diﬀerences. Moreover, focusing on prices of
goods sold online allows me to suppress non-tradable price contributions. Finally, since all products
are stored and dispatched from a single warehouse via DHL Express to every destination, I obtain
information on DHL’s pricing rule, which enables me to control for shipping costs in the analysis.
The empirical results suggest that the non-homothetic model is the only one among the alter-
natives that can account for the observed price variation with respect to the per-capita income and
the size of markets. In particular, after controlling for the cost to ship goods to diﬀerent markets,
I ﬁnd that relative prices are higher in destinations with relatively higher per-capita incomes and
lower in ones with relatively larger populations. The ﬁndings are in line with the predictions of
the non-homothetic model, but they are in contrast with the predictions of the alternative models.
Given the success of the model in explaining the behavior of prices across countries, I use it to
assess the importance of variable mark-ups. I derive a new testable prediction from the model that
relates prices to measurable variables. For a pair of countries, the model predicts that the relative
price of an identical item varies with the destinations’ relative per-capita incomes, trade barriers,
and import shares. Using this prediction, I structurally estimate the elasticity of price with respect
to per-capita income from the unique micro data. The benchmark, mean, and median estimates
are roughly 0.06 and lie within a tight range of 0.0570 and 0.0776 across various exercises.
The magnitudes of the estimates suggest that variable mark-ups are potentially important
in a quantitative sense. I compare the elasticities that result from the micro-level analysis to
estimates that I obtain for the same set of countries for the year 2005 using standard retail price
data of aggregate apparel good categories employed by the existing literature. The aggregate data,
which potentially reﬂect variable mark-ups, varying product quality, and varying retail components
tied to non-tradable channels, yield a price elasticity of 0.17. Hence, variable mark-ups may be
responsible for as much as a third of the cross-country price variation observed in aggregate data.
I contribute to the international pricing literature by developing and using a unique database
that features prices of identical products sold across countries via the Internet. To study the
relationship between prices of tradables and per-capita income, Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and
Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) use prices of aggregate tradable good categories, while Crucini et al.
(2005) employ prices of tradable products with similar characteristics, all of which are collected
from retail locations across countries.1 However, as Burstein et al. (2003) and Crucini and Yilmazkuday
(2009) argue, retail data reﬂect the contributions of non-tradable inputs, whose prices vary system-
atically with countries’ per-capita income levels. Consequently, retail prices of tradables may be
linked to countries’ per-capita income levels through the contributions of non-tradable channels.
To suppress retail components, Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009),
1See Crucini et al. (2005) for a review of the literature that examines prices of retail goods across countries.
2Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Johnson (2011), and Manova and Zhang (2011) use free-on-board
unit values to show that importers with high per-capita income levels pay high prices for imports
from a given source. The observation may reﬂect two distinct mechanisms: (i) rich importers
demand goods of high quality, as postulated by Verhoogen (2008) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011);
and (ii) exporters extract high mark-ups for identical goods from rich importers with low demand
elasticities, as argued in the present paper. While the empirical literature has veriﬁed the varying-
quality hypothesis, it has been unable to test the presence of variable mark-ups across countries
due to the lack of price data of identical goods. In this paper, I aim to ﬁll this gap.
The empirical results that I obtain provide support for an explanation of varying demand
elasticities, and therefore variable mark-ups, that builds on non-homothetic preferences. To derive
the testable predictions that guide the empirical analysis, I rely on a particular utility function that
belongs to the hierarchic-demand class studied by Jackson (1984). Two additional utility functions
of this class have been recently introduced to the international-trade literature that features ﬁrm
heterogeneity. The ﬁrst is the linear demand system used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and
the second is the exponential (CARA) utility used by Behrens et al. (2009). Both frameworks
yield identical qualitative predictions as the present model regarding the behavior of prices within
a country, but they lack tractability, so they are less informative about the variation of relative
prices across countries. In contrast, the utility parametrization that I introduce in this paper
maintains tractability in general equilibrium and is useful for cross-country empirical analysis.
In sum, I develop a tractable heterogeneous-ﬁrm model of international trade that relates prices
of tradable consumption goods to per-capita income diﬀerences. I present direct support for the
model’s mechanism, which builds on non-homothetic preferences, from a unique database that
features prices of identical products sold via the Internet. I use the model’s testable prediction to
estimate the elasticity of price with respect to per-capita income and to assess the importance of
variable mark-ups in explaining the observed cross-country variation in prices of tradables. Overall,
the paper contributes toward the understanding of the role that non-homothetic preferences play
in shaping the pricing behavior of consumption-good producers across countries. Further combin-
ing a price-discrimination mechanism with theories of varying product quality and non-tradable
distribution channels would potentially allow one to obtain a complete picture of the cross-country
patterns of prices of tradables and to quantitatively assess consumers’ welfare gains from trade.
2 Model
2.1 Consumer Problem
I consider a world that consists of a ﬁnite number of countries, I, engaged in trade of varieties of
a ﬁnal good. Let i represent an exporter and j an importer.
I assume that country j is populated by identical consumers of measure Lj who have preferences
3over varieties of a good. Varieties originating from diﬀerent countries enter symmetrically in a










ij (ω) + ¯ q)dω,
where qc
ij (ω) is individual consumption of variety ω from country i in j and ¯ q > 0 is a (non-
country-speciﬁc) constant. To ensure that the utility function is well deﬁned, I assume that, for
all j, Ωj ≡
 I
i=1 Ωij ⊆ ¯ Ω, where ¯ Ω is a compact set containing all potentially-produced varieties.
Notice that the preference relation described above is non-homothetic. Moreover, marginal
utility from each variety, (qc
ij(ω)+¯ q)−1, is bounded at any level of consumption. Hence, a consumer
may not have positive demand for all varieties.
Let yj denote consumer income in j. Then, demand for variety ω from i consumed in a positive
amount in j, qij (ω) > 0, is given by2
qij (ω) = Lj
 










where Nij is the measure of the set Ωij, which contains varieties originating from i.








The environment is static. Each variety is produced by a single ﬁrm using constant-returns-to-scale
technology. Labor is the only factor of production. Following Melitz (2003), I assume that ﬁrms
diﬀer in their productivity, φ, and country of origin, i.
In every country i, there exists a pool of potential entrants who pay a one-time cost, fe > 0,
which entitles them to a single productivity draw from a distribution, G(φ), with support [bi,∞).
A measure Ji of ﬁrms that are able to cover their marginal cost of production enter. However, only
a subset of productive entrants, Nij, produce and sell to market j. These ﬁrms are able to charge
a low enough price so as to generate non-negative demand in expression (1), while making non-
negative proﬁts. Thus, a subset of entrants immediately exit. Hence, in equilibrium, the expected
2See Appendix A.1 for derivation.
4proﬁt of an entrant is zero. Aggregate proﬁt rebates to each consumer are therefore also zero.
Assuming that each consumer has a unit labor endowment—which, when supplied (inelastically)
to the local labor market earns a wage rate of wj—per-capita income necessarily equals wj.
Having described the market structure, I proceed to set up an operating ﬁrm’s maximization
problem. Let the production function of a ﬁrm with productivity draw φ be x(φ) = φl, where l
is the amount of labor used toward the production of ﬁnal output. Moreover, assume that each
ﬁrm from country i wishing to sell to destination j faces an iceberg transportation cost incurred
in terms of labor units, τij ≥ 1, with τii = 1 (∀i). An operating ﬁrm must choose the price of its
good p, accounting for the demand for its product q. I consider a symmetric equilibrium where
all ﬁrms of type φ from i choose identical optimal pricing rules. Thus, I can index each variety by
the productivity and the country of origin of its producer, which allows me to rewrite individual
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− ¯ q, (4)
qij (φ) = Lj
 





Using demand from (5), the proﬁt maximization problem of a ﬁrm with productivity φ from



















To solve this problem, each ﬁrm takes as given the measure of competitors Nj and the aggregate
price statistic Pj. Taking ﬁrst-order conditions, the resulting optimal price that a ﬁrm charges for










2.3 Productivity Thresholds and Firm Mark-Ups
As noted earlier, in this model, not all ﬁrms serve all destinations. In particular, for any pair of
source and destination countries, i and j, only ﬁrms originating from country i with productivity
draws φ ≥ φ∗
ij sell to market j, where φ∗






3I restrict fe to ensure that bi ≤ φ∗
ij(∀i,j).
5Thus, a productivity threshold is the productivity draw of a ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between
serving a market or not, namely one whose variety’s price barely covers the ﬁrm’s marginal cost












The price that a ﬁrm would charge for its variety, however, is limited by the variety’s demand, which
diminishes as the variety’s price rises. In particular, it is the case that consumers in destination
j are indiﬀerent between buying the variety of type φ∗
ij or not. To see this, from (5), notice that
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. (11)
mark-up marginal cost
Expression (11) shows that mark-ups vary along two dimensions in this model. First, more
productive ﬁrms charge higher mark-ups over marginal cost. This prediction is in line with the
behavior of Slovenian manufacturers, as documented by Loecker and Warzynski (2009). Second,
ﬁrms’ prices and mark-ups vary systematically with market characteristics, which are summarized
by the threshold that ﬁrms must surpass in order to serve a destination. The thresholds are, in
turn, equilibrium objects. Consequently, I proceed to characterize the equilibrium of the model.
2.4 Equilibrium of the World Economy
The subset of entrants from i who surpass the productivity threshold φ∗
ij serve destination j. These
ﬁrms, denoted by Nij, satisfy
Nij = Ji[1 − G(φ
∗
ij)]. (12)
6Let g(φ) be the pdf corresponding to the productivity cdf G(φ). Then, the conditional density of


























Furthermore, individual ﬁrm proﬁts are the sum of proﬁt ﬂows from each destination that a ﬁrm











where potential proﬁts from destination j are weighted by the probability that they are realized,
1 − G(φ∗
















Equilibrium. For i,j = 1,...,I, given τij,Lj,bi,fe, ¯ q, and a productivity distribution G(φ), an
equilibrium is a set of total measures of ﬁrms serving j ˆ Nj; productivity thresholds ˆ φ∗
ij; measures
of ﬁrms from i serving j ˆ Nij; conditional densities of ﬁrms from i serving j ˆ  ij(φ); aggregate price
statistics ˆ Pj; total sales of ﬁrms from i serving j ˆ Tij; wage rates ˆ wi; measures of entrants ˆ Ji; and,
∀φ ∈ [φ∗
ij,∞), per-consumer allocations ˆ qc
ij(φ), country allocations ˆ qij(φ), ﬁrm pricing rules ˆ pij(φ),
ﬁrm production rules ˆ xij(φ), and ﬁrm proﬁts ˆ πij(φ), such that: (i) ˆ qc
ij(φ) is given by (4) and solves
the individual consumer’s problem; (ii) ˆ qij(φ) is given by (5) and satisﬁes a country’s aggregate
demand for a variety; (iii) ˆ pij(φ) is given by (7) and solves the ﬁrm’s problem; (iv) ˆ xij(φ) satisﬁes
7goods’ markets clearing ˆ qij(φ) = ˆ xij(φ); (v) ˆ πij(φ) is given by (6); (vi) ˆ Nj, ˆ φ∗
ij, ˆ Nij, ˆ  ij(φ), ˆ Pj, ˆ Tij,
ˆ wi, ˆ Ji jointly satisfy (2), (10), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17).
3 Model Predictions
In this section, I derive the model’s predictions regarding the behavior of ﬁrms within and across
countries. I then discuss how the model relates to the existing literature.
In order to analytically solve the model and to derive stark predictions at the ﬁrm and aggre-
gate levels, I follow Chaney (2008) and assume that ﬁrm productivities are drawn from a Pareto
distribution with cdf G(φ) = 1 − bθ
i/φθ, pdf g(φ) = θbθ
i/φθ+1, and shape parameter θ > 0. The
support of the distribution is [bi,∞), where bi summarizes the level of technology in country i.4
Moreover, varying levels of technology are related to per-capita income diﬀerences across coun-
tries. In particular, a relatively high bi represents a more technologically-advanced country. Such
a country is characterized by relatively more productive ﬁrms, whose marginal costs of production
are low, and by richer consumers, who enjoy higher wages.5
3.1 Price Discrimination
In this section, I discuss the predictions of the model regarding the variation of prices with respect
to two key country characteristics: per-capita income and size. Appendix A.3 contains the proofs.
3.1.1 Prices and Per-Capita Income
Expression (11) above demonstrated that ﬁrm mark-ups across markets depend crucially on the
productivity thresholds of the destinations. Under the assumption that ﬁrm productivities are



























Consider an increase in the per-capita income of destination j, wj, while keeping all other objects
ﬁxed. A rise in wj lowers the threshold in (18), which raises the mark-up in (11). Intuitively,
recall that the marginal utility of a variety is bounded at any level of consumption. Since a
tiny amount of consumption of a variety does not give inﬁnite increase in utility, the consumer
spends her limited income on the subset of potentially-produced items whose prices do not exceed
marginal valuations. An increase in an individual’s income makes new varieties aﬀordable and
4All predictions derived in the remainder of the paper are identical if instead I set bi = bj = b for all i  = j and
let ﬁrms’ production functions be xi(φ) = Aiφl, where Ai is country-speciﬁc total factor productivity.
5In Appendix A.2, I show that, in general equilibrium, a relative increase in bi increases the relative wage in i.
6See Appendix A.2 for derivations.
8the consumer expands her consumption bundle. Hence, the model yields a positive link between
countries’ per-capita incomes and the set of purchased varieties, which is in line with empirical
ﬁndings by Jackson (1984), Hunter and Markusen (1988), Hunter (1991), and Movshuk (2004).
A rise in per-capita income does not only expand an agent’s consumption bundle, but it also
results in an increase in consumption of each positively-consumed variety. To see this, substitute
(10) and (11) into (4) to obtain the following expression for an individual’s consumption of an item
q
c










(19) falls in the cutoﬀ productivity, so the quantity consumed rises in individual income. But, vari-
ations in consumption change elasticities of substitution and consequently aﬀect prices of varieties.
The elasticity of substitution for any two positively-consumed varieties in j, that are produced by
ﬁrms with productivities φ1 and φ2, which originate from countries i and υ respectively, is
σqc
ij(φ1),qc













As the consumer becomes richer, she consumes more of each variety, which drives down the elastic-
ity of substitution between positively-consumed varieties. Prices of these varieties rise in response.
Another intuitive explanation of the price increase involves ordering varieties according to
their “importance” to the consumer. As consumer income rises, new varieties produced by less
productive ﬁrms are added to the consumption set. Conversely, if individual income were to fall,
the new varieties are the ﬁrst to be dropped from a consumer’s bundle. Thus, the preference
relation is “hierarchic”—a term introduced to the consumer-choice literature by Jackson (1984).
The newly-added varieties are less important than the previously-consumed ones, which results
in a fall in the demand elasticities of the latter. Hence, as income rises, prices of all previously-
consumed varieties also rise.












If the per-capita income in market j rises, the productivity threshold falls. According to expression
(20), the demand for a variety becomes less elastic. However, the elasticity of demand is reﬂected





1 − [ǫij(φ)]−1. (21)
As consumer income rises, demand becomes less elastic, which allows ﬁrms to raise their prices.
9Having described the behavior of prices within a country, it is easy to understand how prices of
identical items vary across countries. Consider a ﬁrm with productivity draw φ, originating from
country i and selling an identical variety to markets j and k, that is, φ ≥ max[φ∗
ij,φ∗
ik]. Using














Proposition 1 describes how the relative price relates to the countries’ relative per-capita incomes.
Proposition 1. If trade barriers obey the triangle inequality, (∀j,k,υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk, then the relative
price of a variety sold in two markets is strictly rising in the markets’ relative per-capita incomes.
Intuitively, for a given variety that is sold in two markets, the consumers in the rich country
are less responsive to price changes than the consumers in the poor one. A ﬁrm exploits this
opportunity, amid trade barriers that segment the markets, and charges a high mark-up in the
aﬄuent destination.
3.1.2 Prices and Market Size
Consider an increase in the population size of destination j, Lj, while keeping all other objects
ﬁxed. The productivity threshold in (18) rises, thus lowering the mark-up in expression (11).
Intuitively, as the country becomes larger, it attracts more entrants. Hence, the market becomes
more competitive, which forces a surviving ﬁrm to reduce the price of its variety there.
Once again, having described the behavior of prices within a country, it is easy to understand
how prices of identical items vary across countries. Proposition 2 describes how the relative price
relates to the destinations’ relative sizes.
Proposition 2. For any two countries, j and k, j  = k, if trade barriers obey the triangle inequality,
(∀υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk, and if the inequality for at least one υ  = j is strict, then the relative price of a
variety sold in markets j and k is strictly decreasing in the relative sizes of the markets.
Proposition 2 ensures that the relative price of a variety across two markets falls in the relative
sizes of the markets as long as there is “some gravity” surrounding these markets. One example in
which the necessary restriction holds is when the trade barriers for the two countries whose prices
are being compared, j and k, satisfy τkjτjk > τkk. In this case, the restriction requires that the
cost to sell products within country k is strictly lower than the cost to export products to j and
then import them back to k. This is guaranteed if international shipping costs are strictly higher
than domestic costs of shipping.
In the section that follows, I discuss how the model’s predictions relate to the existing literature.
103.2 Relation to Existing Literature
3.2.1 Per-Capita Income, Prices, and Demand Elasticities: Alternatives Models
In the model outlined in this paper, the price of a variety reﬂects the ﬁrm’s marginal cost of
production and delivery and the consumer’s demand elasticity in a country, which can be seen from
expression (21). Since the elasticity in expression (20) depends on the productivity threshold, it
falls in the per-capita income and rises in the size of the destination. The eﬀects are a byproduct
of the assumed non-homothetic preference relation.
Alternative explanations of varying demand elasticities, and therefore varying prices, exist.
Lach (2007) hypothesizes that prices of consumption goods in Israel fell in the 1990s because there
was a ﬂow of immigrants with low search costs and high demand elasticities into the country during
the period. Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) develop a formal model where high-wage earners have
a high opportunity cost of searching for goods, which allows ﬁrms to charge high prices for identical
goods in rich countries. While their model delivers a positive relationship between prices and per-
capita income, it does not link prices to competition, or market size. On the contrary, the present
model yields a negative relationship between prices and market size.7
Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) use a Lancaster (1979) model to argue that richer agents
consume more per good, which makes them more ﬁnicky and more willing to pay a high price in
order to get closer to consuming their ideal variety. In their model, larger and richer (in per-capita
terms) markets attract more ﬁrms and are consequently more competitive, which forces ﬁrms to
charge lower prices there. Overall, the pro-competitive eﬀect associated with higher per-capita
income dominates the ﬁnickiness eﬀect, so their model predicts that relative prices of identical
varieties are lower in relatively richer (in per-capita terms) and relatively larger markets, which is
in contrast to the present framework.
In other related literature, Bekkers et al. (2011) identify a diﬀerence between the predictions
of monopolistically-competitive models with homogeneous ﬁrms that feature hierarchic demand
versus ones with ﬁnickiness eﬀects regarding the relationship between prices and income inequality
within a country. The authors study variants of the two frameworks that include ﬁnite numbers
of income groups within a country and they consider how increases in the mean-preserving spread
in income, measured by changes in the Atkinson index, aﬀect average prices in a country. The
authors show that, in an ideal-variety framework, a rise in income inequality raises prices, while
the opposite relationship prevails in a hierarchic-demand world.
The authors confront the models with disaggregate import unit-value data for 200 countries.8
7Another model that links prices to market size is Feenstra’s (2003) monopolistically-competitive framework
with homothetic translog preferences. The model, however, does not feature per-capita income eﬀects on prices.
8Bekkers et al. (2011) also examine the quality hypothesis, according to which richer countries pay higher prices
because they consume higher-quality goods. They show that the quality model, like the ideal-variety model, relates
income inequality and prices in a positive manner. However, since the arguments in the present section are concerned
with varying demand elasticities, I do not address the quality hypothesis.
11They ﬁnd that, after controlling for per-capita income, unit values fall in the Atkinson index of
inequality, which suggests that prices are falling in within-country income inequality. The ﬁnding
further supports an explanation of price variation that builds on non-homothetic preferences.
Overall, the discussion in this section suggests that the three competing models that generate
varying demand elasticities have distinctive predictions about the behavior of prices in markets
of diﬀerent sizes and diﬀerent levels of per-capita income. In the empirical section that follows
shortly, I test the predictions of the three models using unique data that allows me to directly link
prices to varying demand elasticities.
3.2.2 Non-Homothetic Preferences and International Trade
The utility function that I employ in this paper represents a preference relation that is non-
homothetic. Non-homothetic preferences have recently made a come-back in international trade
(see Markusen (2010) for a comprehensive discussion on the usefulness of non-homothetic prefer-
ences in accounting for a variety of facts in international economics). Verhoogen (2008) introduces
non-homothetic preferences over goods of varying qualities in a heterogeneous-ﬁrm model of trade
featuring workers with diﬀerent skills in order to examine the eﬀect that product quality up-
grading has on within-industry wage inequality. Furthermore, Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) develop
a framework with non-homothetic preferences over goods of diﬀerent quality which can reconcile
the observation that rich countries are net exporters of higher-quality goods and net importers of
lower-quality goods. The authors use the model to study the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the
welfare of households with varying income levels in rich and poor countries.
Fieler (2010) incorporates non-homothetic preferences in the Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum
(2002) in order to quantitatively explain the lack of trade between rich and poor countries. In that
framework, the set of consumed goods is ﬁxed and identical across countries, so consumption shares
vary with per-capita income, which makes the model potentially useful for cross-sectoral analy-
sis. In contrast, the preference relation that I employ yields hierarchic demand due to bounded
marginal utility of consumption. This feature of the utility function gives consumption sets that are
expanding in per-capita income. Saur´ e (2009) argues that this mechanism has implications about
trade patterns. The author uses the present utility function in the homogeneous monopolistic-
competition framework of Krugman (1980) and derives a positive relationship between per-capita
income and the extensive margin of imports.9 The author’s theoretical results are consistent with
the empirical ﬁndings of Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Feenstra (2010).
Two additional functional forms that belong to the class of hierarchic demand systems have
recently been introduced to the international trade literature featuring ﬁrm heterogeneity. First,
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) use linear demand for varieties to study how mark-ups respond to
changes in market size and trade policy. Their framework features a num´ eraire good that is
9Young (1991) uses the same preference relation in a Ricardian framework to analyze the growth patterns of
countries when ﬁrms engage in learning-by-doing.
12produced with identical linear technology across countries and is freely traded. These assumptions
imply wage equalization across countries and thus income eﬀects on prices are absent from their
model. In Appendix B, I drop the num´ eraire good and I characterize the general equilibrium of
their model allowing for income eﬀects. I then demonstrate that, in this model, the price of a
variety responds to changes in market characteristics in the same qualitative fashion as in the
model that is introduced in the present paper. However, upon inspecting the individual ﬁrm’s
pricing rule obtained from Melitz and Ottaviano’s (2008) model, one can verify that the behavior
of relative prices across countries can only be studied numerically. In addition, a testable prediction
relating relative prices to measurable variables across countries cannot be derived since thresholds
are not explicit functions of parameters and wages.
Second, Behrens et al. (2009) employ exponential (CARA) utility in a general equilibrium
model of international trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms. They use the model to quantitatively
assess the eﬀects of the Canada-US trade liberalization on regional market aggregates such as
wages, productivity, mark-ups, the mass of produced and consumed varieties, as well as welfare.
While their model has desirable aggregate properties such as a gravity equation of trade under
Pareto-distributed ﬁrm productivities, individual-ﬁrm prices and mark-ups are characterized via
the Lambert-W function. Behrens et al. (2009) demonstrate that the model predicts a similar
response of the price of a variety to changes in market characteristics as the two models discussed
above. However, once again, due to lack of tractability, relative prices across countries can only be
examined numerically and a testable prediction that relates them to measurable variables is not
available.
On the contrary, the non-homothetic preference representation that I employ throughout the
paper allows me to obtain a testable prediction that links relative prices to measurable variables,
one of which is per-capita income. I propose this particular utility function because it oﬀers
tractability and it allows me to relate the model’s prediction to observed data. In the empirical
section of the paper, I derive the testable prediction about the behavior of prices across countries.
I then use the expression to structurally estimate the elasticity of price with respect to per-capita
income from unique price data and to gauge the quantitative relevance of variable mark-ups.
Before engaging in this exercise, however, I demonstrate that observed cross-country price patterns
support an explanation of price variation that builds on hierarchic demand.
4 Empirical Analysis
In subsection 3.2.1, I described three models that feature varying demand elasticities and link
prices of tradables to destinations’ per-capita incomes. In this section, I present a unique database
that includes prices of identical goods sold online, which allows me to establish a link between
demand elasticities and mark-ups across countries. First, I use the database in order to learn
what mechanism is responsible for delivering varying demand elasticities, and therefore varying
13prices, across countries. Second, I use the model supported by the data in order to evaluate the
importance of variable mark-ups.
4.1 Description of Data
I collect price data from the online catalogues of a Spanish apparel manufacturer called Mango.
Mango specializes in the production of clothing, footwear, and accessories for middle-income female
consumers, although in 2009, they also established a men’s line. The company opened its ﬁrst
store in Barcelona in 1984. Currently, Mango has 1220 stores in 91 countries. Mango’s ﬁnancial
statement dated 2007 shows that total annual sales amounted to 1.956 billion USD, out of which
76 percent was generated from exports. Mango is the second largest textile exporter in Spain and
it employs 7800 people.
Mango operates a large-scale online store at http://shop.mango.com.10 Each participating
country has a website and customers from one country cannot buy products from another country’s
website due to shipping restrictions. Thus, a customer with a shipping address in Germany can
only have items delivered to her if purchased from the German Mango website.
Two unique features of the data allow me to empirically test the price-discrimination hypoth-
esis. First, products sold in each market are identical, so quality diﬀerences are not responsible
for the variation in prices across markets. This feature of the data distinguishes the analysis
from studies that employ unit values (see Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hummels and Lugovskyy
(2009), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Johnson (2011), and Manova and Zhang (2011)). Second,
all products are sold online and prices do not reﬂect non-tradable contributions, which typically
appear in retail prices, such as those used by Hsieh and Klenow (2007), Alessandria and Kaboski
(2011), and Crucini et al. (2005). I expand on each of these points below.
The online catalogue constitutes an identical basket of nearly one hundred products oﬀered in
all participating countries each season.11 Each item in the catalogue has a unique name and an
8-digit code reported in every country. All items are stored and ship out of a single warehouse
located in Palau de Plegamans, Spain, regardless of the shipping destination. Thus, prices do not
reﬂect destination-speciﬁc production and storage costs. Upon receiving an online order, Mango
ships the items via DHL Express.12 So, in addition to mark-ups, prices may reﬂect shipping costs.
The shipping and handling policy of Mango is such that no explicit fee is paid on purchases
above a minimum value, which diﬀers across countries. All other purchases incur an explicit
10Recently, some of Mango’s competitors have begun to operate similar stores online. These companies include
Zara (http://www.zara.com)—Spain’s largest apparel exporter, H & M (http://www.hm.com/entrance.ahtml)—
Sweden’s largest apparel exporter, and Miss Sixty (http://www.misssixty.com/Index.aspx)—a division of Italy’s
Sixty Spa. At the time the study was conducted (in 2008), Mango’s online store had the widest coverage of
countries and items, which is necessary for empirical analysis, and it allowed one to collect prices of items in every
country. As of 2011, Mango has expanded its online store to a larger set of countries.
11Often items sold online do not appear in stores and vice verse.
12I conducted a controlled experiment and collected DHL tracking codes for an identical item sent to all destina-
tions and veriﬁed that the shipping and production origin are identical, regardless of destination.
14shipping and handling fee. Many items sold by Mango classify for free shipping. However, it is not
always the case that the same product ships at no fee to diﬀerent destinations, since the minimum
price requirement as well as the actual Euro-denominated price of the product often diﬀer across
markets. Thus, it is necessary to control for shipping costs in the analysis.
Information on the actual cost of shipping and handling that Mango incurs is not publicly
available. In addition, the shipping and handling fees that Mango reports online may reﬂect
variable mark-ups rather than true costs of shipping. So, it is not desirable to use this information
to measure Mango’s shipping costs. Instead, I use the structure of the model and the pricing rule
reported by DHL, the company that Mango uses for shipping, in order to estimate trade barriers.
I discuss estimation details in the next subsection.
Finally, prices reported on all EU-member websites are inclusive of sales taxes, or VAT. Accord-
ing to the European Commission, a company headquartered in an EU country, selling products
online, and dispatching its products from its domestic location to another EU market, faces the fol-
lowing tax rule: (a) Add destination-speciﬁc VAT if annual sales per destination exceed a threshold
value; (b) Choose between domestic and destination-speciﬁc VAT if annual sales per destination
are below a threshold value.13 Mango’s sales data per destination are not publicly available. How-
ever, the European Commission reports the VAT rates on clothing for each member country, and
Spain’s rate is the third lowest in the sample. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Mango would
choose to apply the Spanish tax rate, if possible. So, in the benchmark analysis, I use prices col-
lected from each country’s website under the assumption that they reﬂect Spanish VAT. I conduct
robustness exercises that account for destination-speciﬁc sales taxes in Appendices C.1 and C.2.
Table 1: Per-Capita Income and Average Price of Items, 18 Countries
Country Austria Belgium Estonia Finland France Germany
Mean Price 66.10 63.51 64.74 67.06 62.30 65.80
Country Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Norway Portugal
Mean Price 57.29 65.25 73.29 64.13 74.10 51.71
Country Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom
Mean Price 72.19 64.10 51.57 72.50 73.22 63.44
corr(mean price, per-capita income)=0.5248**
** signiﬁcance at 5%-level
Data Sources: Prices for 180 goods from March/September 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer
Mango. Exchange rates for March/September 2008 from ECB. Nominal per-capita GDP for 2007 from WDI.
I conclude the discussion with a summary of the price data. Table 1 reports the mean product
price in Euro in each of the eighteen countries used in the analysis. The cross-country correlation
between per-capita income and the average price is 0.52. Norway—the richest country in the
sample—experiences the highest average price, which is 1.44 times higher than the lowest average
13See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/taxation/vat/how vat works/vat on services/index en.htm
15price observed in the home country—Spain.
4.2 Empirical Tests of Three Models
4.2.1 Ingredients
To test the predictions of the models, I use prices of 180 goods in 18 markets. I consider prod-
ucts from the Summer and Winter 2008 catalogues, which became available online in March and
September of 2008, respectively. By pooling the data, I minimize the possibility of seasonal bias.
Prices are recorded in local currency. Two thirds of the countries in the sample were members of
the Euro area in 2008. For the remaining countries in the sample, I convert prices into Euro using
the European Central Bank’s average exchange rate for March/September of 2008—the months
when the catalogues were posted online and the data were collected. I also report results that I
obtain using exchange rates for February/August and January/July of 2008 to capture the fact
that Mango may have priced its products one or two months prior to posting the catalogues online.
The reader can verify that the ﬁndings are robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.14
I now discuss the approximation of shipping costs. Mango ships its products via DHL, which
oﬀers a menu of prices for repeated shipments.15 Thus, the actual cost that Mango incurs cannot
be inferred. But, DHL prices all shipments according to regions. For an exporter, the main
determinant of the price to ship to a region is distance, and regions are ranked according to
numbers, with 1 being the cheapest region.
To control for the eﬀect that Mango’s shipping costs have on goods’ prices, I construct distance-
interval dummy variables with DHL’s regional classiﬁcation in mind. From CEPII, I obtain the
distance between Spain and every European country featured in the Spanish DHL catalogue. I
construct four non-overlapping distance intervals. The upper bound on each distance interval is
the maximum distance between Spain and the destinations within a given DHL region. Then, I
construct an M   (I − 1)−by−4 matrix c, where M and I are the numbers of goods and countries
in the study (with Spain being the num´ eraire), respectively. In column i of matrix c, i = 1,...,4,
I make an entry of one if the destination-good pair is associated with a country whose distance
from Spain lies in the i-th interval, and zero otherwise.
Finally, I use per-capita GDP (in current US dollars) and population size for the year 2007
from the World Development Indicators.
14It is redundant to repeat the analysis using exchange rates that were eﬀective three or more months prior to
the month when the catalogue was posted online since seasonal catalogues have a lifespan of three months. Given
the short product lifespan, exchange rate volatility is likely not a major concern for Mango. Hence, the data are
useful for a cross-sectional study such as the one undertaken in this paper. In that respect, the nature of the
exercise is very diﬀerent from typical empirical pricing-to-market investigations, which rely on time variation in
prices of products with similar characteristics in order to infer the degree of nominal exchange-rate pass through
(see Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a comprehensive review of the relevant literature).
15All information on DHL contained in this and subsequent paragraphs is available at http://www.dhl.es/en.html.
164.2.2 Econometric Model
To motivate the econometric speciﬁcation, I revisit the predictions of the three models in more
detail. First, in a two-country, two-tradable-good search framework, Alessandria and Kaboski
(2011) show that ﬁrms add a mark-up to the marginal cost of production in each market. The
mark-up is higher in the country where consumers enjoy higher per-capita income levels. Hence,
the model predicts that the relative price of an item across two markets depends on good-speciﬁc
characteristics (since mark-ups are additive) and relative per-capita incomes of the destinations.
Market size plays no role in determining the price of individual goods in the model.
Second, the ideal-variety framework of Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) predicts that the rela-
tive price of a variety is lower in markets with relatively higher per-capita incomes and relatively
larger populations. In addition, goods’ characteristics aﬀect relative prices because relative (net)
mark-ups reﬂect marginal costs of production and delivery.
Third, the non-homothetic model predicts that relative prices are higher in relatively richer
(in per-capita terms) and lower in relatively larger markets (in terms of population size). This
prediction is in contrast with the search model, which does not link prices to market size, and with
the ideal-variety model, which negatively links relative prices to both relative per-capita incomes
and relative market sizes. Finally, (22) suggests that good-speciﬁc characteristics do not aﬀect
relative prices across diﬀerent destinations in the non-homothetic model.
















+ ˆ γcc + ξjm. (23)
In the above expression, pjm/psm is the Euro-denominated price of item m in country j, relative
to the item’s price in Spain. ˆ γm is item m’s ﬁxed-eﬀect coeﬃcient estimate. wj/ws is country j’s
per-capita income, relative to Spain’s, and ˆ γw is the corresponding estimated coeﬃcient. Lj/Ls
is country j’s population, relative to Spain’s, and ˆ γL is the corresponding estimated coeﬃcient.
c is the shipping cost matrix discussed above and ˆ γc is the associated vector of coeﬃcients, with
typical element ˆ γci, i = 1,...,4. ξjm is an error term.
In the above speciﬁcation, a positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimate of ˆ γw and a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant estimate of ˆ γL is in line with the predictions of the non-homothetic
model only. The search model predicts that ˆ γL is not diﬀerent from zero, while the ideal-variety
model predicts that both ˆ γw and ˆ γL are negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Before proceeding to the empirical results, I should note that the ideal-variety model predicts
that the relative price of a variety is higher in markets with relatively higher per-capita incomes,
after controlling for relative incomes. Intuitively, when one controls for total income, which is
the product of per-capita income and market size, one disentangles the ﬁnickiness eﬀect from
the pro-competitive eﬀect caused by rising per-capita. Since, overall, the model yields a negative
17relationship between relative prices and relative per-capita incomes, it must be the case that the
model predicts that the (positive) elasticity of relative prices with respect to relative per-capita
incomes falls short of the (negative) elasticity of relative prices with respect to relative incomes.
In a supplementary appendix, I demonstrate that the non-homothetic model also predicts that
relative prices are increasing in relative per-capita incomes, after controlling for relative incomes.
However, contrary to the ideal-variety framework, the non-homothetic model generates a higher
(positive) elasticity of relative prices with respect to relative per-capita income than the (negative)
elasticity of relative prices with respect to relative income. Hence, a second test for the non-
homothetic versus the ideal-variety framework is whether the sum of the elasticities is positive in
the data. In the same appendix, I perform this test and demonstrate that the empirical results
oﬀer support to the non-homothetic model.
4.2.3 Results
Table 2: Test of Alternative Models, 18 Countries
Exchange (ˆ γw (ˆ γL (ˆ γc,1 (ˆ γc,2 (ˆ γc,3 (ˆ γc,4
Rate (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0646** -0.0282** -0.0105 (0.2063*** (0.2497*** (0.2036***
(0.0309) (0.0126) (0.0226) (0.0180) (0.0141) (0.0383)
Feb/Aug (0.0699** -0.0243** -0.0046 (0.2049*** (0.2491*** (0.2123***
(0.0304) (0.0117) (0.0221) (0.0173) (0.0143) (0.0384)
Jan/Jul (0.0635** -0.0231* -0.0055 (0.2071*** (0.2527*** (0.2146***
(0.0303) (0.0120) (0.0221) (0.0172) (0.0154) (0.0388)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** signiﬁcance at 5%-level, *** signiﬁcance at 1%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire), Fixed Eﬀects 179 (relative to good 1)
Distance Intervals (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance from CEPII. Nominal per-capita GDP and population for 2007 from WDI.
I estimate the coeﬃcients in (23) using the OLS estimator and I cluster all errors by destination.
The results from the empirical test of the three models are reported in Table 2. The coeﬃcient
estimates on per-capita income are positive and statistically signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcients on
country size are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. These results support the non-homothetic
model over the two alternatives.
The dummy associated with the ﬁrst region is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This result
is due to the fact that Portugal is the only country that belongs to the ﬁrst distance region, as it
is the only country that is classiﬁed in the ﬁrst zone of shipping according to DHL Spain. The
remainder of the regions display very high and statistically-signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients, which
suggests that prices increase sharply in the cost of shipping.
184.2.4 Endogeneity and Robustness
A potential source of endogeneity in the empirical analysis above is omitted-variables bias. For
example, in addition to distance, other destination-speciﬁc variables may be responsible for the
DHL shipping costs that Mango incurs. If the omitted variables are reﬂected in the items’ prices
and if they co-vary with the per-capita income or the size of the destinations, then the estimates
of ˆ γw and ˆ γL will be biased (see Chapter 4 in Wooldridge (2002)).
While distance is a critical determinant of the cost to ship a product, international shipping
costs may reﬂect additional geographic characteristics of countries. For example, if the destination
is an island, ground transport cannot be used. If air of sea transport is used instead, the shipping
cost may diﬀer. Consequently, for robustness, I expand the benchmark speciﬁcation in (23) to
accommodate a dummy variable, isl, which takes on the value of one if the destination is an island
country, and zero otherwise. Table 3 reports the results from the exercise. ˆ γisl represents the
coeﬃcient estimate of the “island” eﬀect and it is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. In addition,
the estimated coeﬃcients on per-capita income and size remain practically unchanged.
Table 3: Robust Test of Alternative Models, 18 Countries
Exchange (ˆ γw (ˆ γL (ˆ γc,1 (ˆ γc,2 (ˆ γc,3 (ˆ γc,4 (ˆ γisl
Rate (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0651** -0.0286** -0.0109 (0.2077*** (0.2533*** (0.2027*** -0.0083
(0.0315) (0.0133) (0.0230) (0.0204) (0.0114) (0.0395) (0.0204)
Feb/Aug (0.0693** -0.0238* -0.0042 (0.2034*** (0.2451*** (0.2133*** (0.0092
(0.0309) (0.0124) (0.0221) (0.0185) (0.0112) (0.0394) (0.0174)
Jan/Jul (0.0626** -0.0224* -0.0048 (0.2051*** (0.2471*** (0.2160*** (0.0132
(0.0307) (0.0127) (0.0220) (0.0181) (0.0115) (0.0398) (0.0175)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** signiﬁcance at 5%-level, *** signiﬁcance at 1%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire), Fixed Eﬀects 179 (relative to good 1)
Distance Intervals (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance from CEPII. Nominal per-capita GDP and population for 2007 from WDI.
Finally, as discussed in section 4.1, cross-country sales-tax variation may cause systematic
price deviations. So, for robustness purposes, in Table 6 of Appendix C.1, I repeat the analysis by
explicitly controlling for diﬀerences in sales taxes across destinations. Sales tax variation does not
appear to be a source of bias in the analysis, since the estimated coeﬃcient of a destination’s gross
sales tax, relative to Spain’s tax, is not statistically diﬀerent from zero in any of the speciﬁcations.
In sum, the empirical results suggest that the non-homothetic model outlined in this paper has
the ability to account for the observed cross-country variation in prices along two key dimensions:
per-capita income and size of destinations. On a broader scale, the empirical ﬁndings can be viewed
as providing support for an explanation of price variation that builds on hierarchic demand.
194.3 Structural Estimates of Price Elasticities
Section 4.2 above empirically tests three theories that aim to explain the positive relationship
between per-capita income and prices of tradables. However, the estimation thus far has not been
structural, so the empirical analysis has not been informative about the magnitude of the elasticity
of price with respect to per-capita income and the importance of variable mark-ups. Given that
the non-homothetic model appears to be qualitatively in line with the pricing behavior observed
in the data, I use it to accomplish this task. First, I derive a testable prediction of the model
that relates prices to measurable variables. Second, I use the prediction, together with the dataset
described above, to structurally estimate the elasticity of price with respect to per-capita income
and to quantify the role of variable mark-ups in international trade.
4.3.1 A Testable Prediction
To derive the model’s testable prediction about price variation, substitute the thresholds from (18)
























      
. (24)
barriers pc income general equilibrium object
The ﬁrst term emphasizes the role of trade barriers, while the third represents an equilibrium
object, where the contributions of each destination’s per-capita income and size are marginal since
they are contained within a summation term. Hence, identiﬁcation of the price elasticity with
respect to per-capita income must come from the second term, which is simply a ratio of per-
capita incomes of two destinations. The problem with taking this expression to the data, however,
is the fact that the lower bound on each country’s productivity distribution, bυ, is not observable.
To solve the problem, make use of predicted trade shares, which are observable statistics. First,
multiply (19) by the destination’s size Lj to obtain the quantity sold in j by a ﬁrm with productivity
φ from i. To derive i’s total sales in j, substitute this quantity, as well as the price from (11),
the conditional density from (13) under the Pareto parametrization, and the measure of exporters
from (12) using the equilibrium measure of entrants Ji = Li/[(θ + 1)fe] derived in Appendix A.2,
into expression (15). Then, using expression (18) and the fact that τijwi/φ∗
ij = τjjwj/φ∗
jj (∀i  = j)











Finally, substitute (25) into (24) to obtain the following testable prediction that relates relative
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barriers pc income market share
Below, I rewrite this expression in logs and I multiply and divide logged trade barriers by θ for



































The model predicts that, after controlling for relative import shares and scaled relative trade barri-
ers, the elasticity of relative prices with respect to relative per-capita incomes is βw ≡ 1/[2(θ + 1)].
In the proceeding subsections, I estimate this elasticity from Mango’s price data. First, I discuss the
additional data ingredients necessary for estimation. Then, I proceed to describe the econometric
model employed. Finally, I report the empirical results and I conduct robustness exercises.
4.3.2 Ingredients
In order to estimate the elasticity of relative prices with respect to relative per-capita incomes, I
need four variables. The two key variables, namely prices and per-capita income, were described
in Section 4.2. I discuss the remaining variables next.
Given Mango’s line of work, to measure trade shares λij, I focus on the industry titled “Textiles,
textile products, leather and footwear” in the Stats.OECD database. I let the denominator in the
trade-share expression be Gross Output + Imports (from countries in the sample) - Exports (to
countries in the sample), which represents a country’s total expenditure on goods of the particular
industry. The numerator in (25) is country j’s imports from country i in the industry.
While trade shares are observable, trade barriers are not. Since I assume that trade barriers
are of the iceberg form, I can estimate them from the model’s gravity equation of trade. To derive
gravity between an exporter i and an importer j, simply take the log of the ratio of the import






= Sj − Si − θlogτij. (27)
In the expression above, Sj = θlog(wj)−log(Lj)−θ log(bj)(∀j). Intuitively, this variable captures
the average eﬀect that a particular country’s characteristics have on its imports. Si captures the
21eﬀect that a country’s characteristics have on its exports. From expression (26), however, the
variables of interest for the pricing analysis are the logged trade barriers, scaled by θ.
Motivated by DHL’s pricing rule, I assume that trade barriers take on the following form
logτij = dk + δij, (28)
where dk, k = 1,...,5, quantiﬁes the eﬀect of the distance between i and j lying in the k-th
interval.16 δij is an error term, assumed to be a random variable distributed according to N(0,Σ),
where Σ is a diagonal square matrix with a typical entry of σ2 along the diagonal.
I apply least squares to estimate scaled logged bilateral trade barriers for all the countries in the
sample using equations (27) and (28). Sj and Si are simply the estimated coeﬃcients of importer-
and exporter-speciﬁc dummy variables, respectively. Although I only need the trade barriers that
Spain faces for the estimation of price elasticities that follows, I use the full sample of countries to
estimate the trade barriers in order to be able to separately identify the contributions of distance
on scaled logged trade barriers from importer-speciﬁc characteristics.
The R-squared of the regression is 0.8606. The coeﬃcient estimates and summary statistics are
reported in Table 11 in Appendix D. Using the coeﬃcient estimates on the ﬁve distance intervals,
I construct the scaled logged trade barriers that Spain faces to export to every destination. The
goal is to use these estimates in the econometric model corresponding to (26), which I derive next.
4.3.3 Econometric Model
Using Spain as num´ eraire, dropping country-of-origin subscripts since Mango is from Spain, and


























≡ θlog(ˆ τsj/ˆ τss) = θlog ˆ τsj represents the diﬀerence between the scaled logged
trade barriers from Spain to destination j and the scaled logged trade barriers from Spain to
itself. By the assumptions of the model, iceberg costs are expressed relative to domestic shipping
costs, which are normalized to unity. Hence, ˆ τss = 1, which implies that θlog ˆ τss = 0. The
“hat” appearing in θlog ˆ τsj is to remind the reader that scaled logged trade barriers are estimates
16I use the following distance intervals (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953], (2953,max]. The
ﬁrst four distance intervals are from Section 4.2 and the ﬁfth ensures that all bilateral distances are accounted for.
Quantifying the eﬀects of distance on trade ﬂows via distance interval dummies is reminiscent of Eaton and Kortum’s
(2002) work. A variety of speciﬁcations for trade barriers exist (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)). For
example, it is common to use data on tariﬀs and freight charges in order to approximate trade barriers. This
approach is not applicable in the present study. First, all the countries in the sample are members of the European
Economic Area, so bilateral tariﬀs are zero. Second, Mango’s actual shipping costs are not publicly available.
22obtained from the gravity regression in the previous section. wj/ws is the per-capita income of
country j, relative to Spain. λj/λs is the import share of country j from Spain, relative to Spain’s
domestic expenditure share. ψjm is an error term which arises because Mango’s true trade costs
may diﬀer from the trade-barrier estimates that I employ in the analysis.
4.3.4 Trade-Barrier Measurement Error
An important measurement-error issue needs to be addressed. In the econometric model in (29),
I use estimates of trade barriers obtained from bilateral trade data. A classical error-in-variables
problem may arise if trade barriers are measured with error, and the estimates of ˆ βτ may be biased
toward zero, as discussed in Levi (1973). The direction of the bias in the estimate of any remaining
coeﬃcient depends on the covariance between the variable whose coeﬃcient is being estimated and
the variable measured with error. In the present study, it would be worrisome if trade barriers
co-varied with destinations’ per-capita incomes because estimates of ˆ βw would be biased if the
trade barriers were measured with error.
To understand how the measurement error of trade barriers behaves, I compute the residuals
from the gravity estimation. From expressions (27) and (28) it is clear that, by assumption, the
gravity residuals represent the negative of the measurement error of logged trade barriers, scaled
by θ. I focus on the seventeen residuals associated with Spain’s export shares per market. An OLS
regression of the residuals on the logged per-capita incomes of the destinations, relative to Spain,
and a constant term yields a slope coeﬃcient estimate of -0.6446 with a t-statistic of -1.92 (see
Table 9 in Appendix D). Hence, the measurement error of trade barriers is systematically related
to the per-capita income of the destination and it may bias the estimate of the price elasticity.
I tackle the issue of measurement error in two steps. First, I use the entire expression (28),
scaled by θ, rather than θlog ˆ τij only, in the estimation of the price elasticity in (29). This way I
explicitly account for the error terms in the elasticity estimation.
Second, I employ an instrumental variable (2SLS) approach. When I use the estimated trade
barriers (without the error terms) in (29), I instrument per-capita income with labor productivity
in the “Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear” industry. The argument for the 2SLS
estimation is that the per-capita income (or wage) vector is endogenous to the model and it is
determined in equilibrium (see expression (a.9) in Appendix A.2). In particular, the per-capita
income vector depends on trade barriers, among other parameters, so it is correlated with the
measurement error in trade barriers. Moreover, as I demonstrate in the same Appendix, in the
general equilibrium of this model, per-capita income is mainly driven by average productivity,
which is intimately linked to the lower bound of the Pareto productivity distribution b. Hence, it
is reasonable to use labor productivity as an instrument in the analysis. In the empirical exercise
that follows, I compute labor productivity as the ratio of value added of the “Textiles, textile
products, leather and footwear” industry (in volumes) and employment in the same industry.
234.3.5 Results
Below I report the results from the two estimations. I cluster all standard errors by destination.
Table 4: Benchmark Estimation With Error-Adjusted Trade Barriers, 18 Countries
Exchange Rate (ˆ βw ( ˆ βλ (ˆ βτ
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0599* -0.0254 (0.0334*
(0.0321) (0.0242) (0.0180)
Feb/Aug (0.0623** -0.0229 (0.0355*
(0.0305) (0.0239) (0.0180)
Jan/Jul (0.0580* -0.0253 (0.0337*
(0.0310) (0.0248) (0.0183)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** signiﬁcance at 5%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire).
Distance Intervals for Gravity (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953], (2953,max]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance from CEPII. Bilateral trade and gross output for “Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear”
industry for 2006 from Stats.OECD.









129.97 (0.5708*** 0.0203 (0.0215
(0.0434) (0.0474) (0.0393)
Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Regression
Exchange Rate (ˆ βw ( ˆ βλ (ˆ βτ
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0590** -0.0587* (0.0080
(0.0255) (0.0324) (0.0246)
Feb/Aug (0.0627*** -0.0557* (0.0104
(0.0244) (0.0321) (0.0246)
Jan/Jul (0.0570** -0.0558* (0.0105
(0.0244) (0.0322) (0.0248)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** signiﬁcance at 5% level, *** signiﬁcance at 1%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire).
Distance Intervals for Gravity (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953], (2953,max]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance from CEPII. Bilateral trade, gross output, value added (in volumes), and number of persons employed
for “Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear” industry for 2006 from Stats.OECD.
The results from the OLS regression that uses the estimated trade barriers adjusted by the
24error terms are reported in Table 4. The estimated elasticity of price with respect to per-capita
income, ˆ βw, is roughly 0.06. Across the diﬀerent exchange-rate speciﬁcations, the estimate lies
within a tight range of 0.0580 to 0.0623.
Table 5 reports the results from the two stages of the 2SLS estimation. ˆ βFS represents the
vector of coeﬃcient estimates from the ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS regression, where per-capita income
is the endogenous covariate and labor productivity is the instrument. In theory, labor productivity
is a good instrument because it is assumed to be exogenous to the model. The results from the ﬁrst
stage of the estimation suggest that productivity is indeed a strong instrument. More importantly,
once again, the estimate of the price elasticity is roughly 0.06. Across the diﬀerent exchange-rate
speciﬁcations the estimate ranges between 0.0570 and 0.0627.
4.3.6 Robustness
While distance is a critical determinant of the cost to ship a product, international trade barriers
may reﬂect additional geographic characteristics of countries. For robustness purposes, I expand
the trade-barrier speciﬁcation in (28) as follows
logτij = dk + db + dc + dl + do + δij. (30)
Among the new variables, db quantiﬁes the eﬀect of sharing a border, dc captures the eﬀect of
having coastal access, dl quantiﬁes the eﬀect of sharing a common language, and do captures the
eﬀect of having common legal origin. Each variable takes on the value of one if the statement
applies to a pair of countries and zero otherwise.
Table 12 in Appendix D reports the results from the gravity estimation, which yields an R-
squared of 0.8781. Compared to the benchmark, the richer trade-cost speciﬁcation marginally
improves the ﬁt of the gravity equation. Once again, the residuals vary systematically with coun-
tries’ per-capita incomes. An OLS regression of the residuals of Spanish exports on the log of
per-capita income of the destination, relative to Spain, and a constant term yields a slope coeﬃ-
cient estimate of -0.6989 with a t-statistic of -2.30 (see Table 9 in Appendix D).
Table 13 in the same Appendix summarizes the results from an OLS estimation of the price
elasticity that includes the error-adjusted trade barriers from (30). The estimated elasticity of price
with respect to per-capita income varies between 0.0652 and 0.0701. The estimates are somewhat
higher than the benchmark estimates reported above. Table 14 in the same appendix reports the
results from the 2SLS estimation which uses labor productivity as instrument. The coeﬃcient
estimates on per-capita income are similar and they lie within the range of 0.0722 and 0.0776.
Finally, in Appendix C.2, I introduce destination-speciﬁc sales taxes into the benchmark model
and I derive an augmented testable prediction that accounts for cross-country tax variation. The
estimates of ˆ βw remain unchanged, while the coeﬃcients on taxes are not statistically diﬀerent from
zero, which suggests that sales-tax variation is not responsible for the systematic price variation.
254.4 Discussion on the Importance of Variable Mark-ups
Across the various empirical exercises, the estimates of the elasticity of price with respect to per-
capita income range between 0.0570 and 0.0776. The mean and the median among the eighteen
estimates amount to 0.0635 and 0.0619, respectively, or roughly six percent. Notice that these es-
timates compare favorably to the estimates of the price elasticity obtained from the non-structural
econometric model that aimed to test the three frameworks in Section 4.2. This serves as evidence
in support of the choice of the econometric model that was used to test the diﬀerent explanations
of varying demand elasticities.
Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that doubling a country’s per-capita income results in at
least a six-percent rise in the price level of tradable apparel products due to variable mark-ups.
Does this mean that variable mark-ups are important in accounting for the observed diﬀerences in
prices of tradables across countries?
A simple way to answer this question is to compare the elasticity estimates arising from the ex-
ercises above to estimates obtained from aggregate data. The existing literature typically uses data
from the International Comparison Program (ICP) in order to study the relationship between prices
of tradables and per-capita income (see Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and Alessandria and Kaboski
(2011) for example). Following this literature, I obtain the latest ICP data for the year 2005,
which includes prices of aggregate good categories, or basic headings, collected in retail locations
across countries. In these data, prices potentially diﬀer across countries due to variable mark-ups
(as argued in this paper), varying product quality (perhaps due to non-homothetic preferences
over quality as in Verhoogen (2008) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011)), and varying retail components
tied to non-tradable channels (as in Burstein et al. (2003) and Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2009)).








































































































Per−Capita Income and Price of Tradables














































































































Per−Capita Income and Price of Apparel and Footwear
Figure 1: Per-Capita Income and Prices
26In the left panel of Figure 1 I plot the price levels of tradables against the per-capita incomes
of the countries in Table 1. Following the literature, I compute the price level of tradables as the
geometric average of prices of basic headings that correspond to tradable good categories. Clearly,
prices of tradables are higher in countries with higher per-capita incomes. A linear regression of
logged price levels of tradables, relative to Spain, on a constant and logged per-capita incomes, rela-
tive to Spain, yields a slope coeﬃcient of 0.3361 and a t-statistic of 12.85 (see Table 10 in Appendix
D). This result is robust in the literature. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and Alessandria and Kaboski
(2011) ﬁnd an elasticity of 0.3 using the 1996 ICP data across a large set of countries.
The observations in the left panel of the ﬁgure, however, span across industries, so it is diﬃcult
to relate them to the statistics obtained in this paper. For this reason, in the right panel of the
ﬁgure, I plot the geometric average of prices of basic headings corresponding to apparel, footwear,
and accessories. A linear regression of logged prices of these products on logged per-capita income
and a constant yields a slope coeﬃcient of 0.17 and a t-statistic of 13.85 (again see Table 10).
One simple way to assess the importance of variable mark-ups is to compare the slope coeﬃcient
estimate of 0.17 with the estimate of 0.06, which resulted from the structural analysis that used
prices of identical products in the same industry across the same set of countries. The diﬀerence in
magnitudes suggests that variable mark-ups may be responsible for roughly a third of the observed
variation in prices of apparel across countries. So, while mark-ups are potentially important,
combining a price-discrimination mechanism with theories of varying product quality and non-
tradable distribution channels would allow one to obtain a complete picture of the cross-country
behavior of prices of tradables and to quantitatively assess consumers’ welfare gains from trade.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that ﬁrms’ variable mark-ups represent a key contributor to the empirically
documented regularity that ﬁnal tradable goods’ prices are systematically positively related to
countries’ per-capita incomes. I outline a parsimonious and highly tractable heterogeneous-ﬁrm
model of international trade that relates prices of tradable goods to per-capita income diﬀerences.
I present direct support for the model’s mechanism, which builds on non-homothetic consumer
preferences, from a unique database that features prices of identical apparel products sold via the
Internet. Finally, I use the model’s testable prediction to structurally estimate the elasticity of
price with respect to per-capita income and to assess the importance of variable mark-ups.
On a broader scale, this paper emphasizes the role that income diﬀerences play in shaping
cross-country price variations in tradable consumption goods as well as in determining aggregate
consumption patterns. Since tradable goods account for an ever increasing portion of consumption
bundles of individuals, their prices directly aﬀect consumer welfare. Hence, having obtained an
understanding of one of the key mechanisms that aﬀect the behavior of prices across countries, we
can further pursue the measurement of welfare of consumers in an integrated world economy.
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A Appendix: Consumer Problem and Equilibrium
A.1 Deriving Consumer Demand























where νj is the Lagrange multiplier. The FOCs yield (∀qc








i=1 Ωij be the set of all positively-consumed varieties in country j. Letting Nij be the
measure of set Ωij, the measure of Ωj, Nj, is given by Nj =
 I
i=1 Nij.
For any pair of varieties ωij,ω′
υj ∈ Ωj, (a.1) gives
pij (ω)(q
c




′) + pυj (ω
′) ¯ q.
Integrating over all ω′
υj ∈ Ωj, keeping in mind that the measure of Ωυj is Nυj, yields the consumer’s
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Ωυj pυj (ω′)dω′ is an aggregate price statistic.
The total demand for variety ω from i by consumers in j becomes
qij (ω) = Lj
 





A.2 Equilibrium: Characterization, Existence, and Uniqueness
In this section, I rely on the Pareto distribution of ﬁrm productivities and characterize the equi-
librium objects of the model. I express all objects in terms of wages and I derive a set of equations
that solve for the wage rates of all countries simultaneously. I use υ as a counter throughout.
Using the optimal price (11), the measure of ﬁrms (12), and the conditional density (13) under






































































In order to solve the model, it is necessary to jointly determine the wages, wi, and the measures
of entrants, Ji, ∀i. The system of equilibrium equations consists of the free entry condition, (16),
and the income/spending equality, (17), for each country.








 θ ¯ qτiυwiLυ
φ∗
iυ(θ + 1)(2θ + 1)
. (a.6)
The income/spending identity requires that country i’s consumers spend their entire income on













Expressions (a.6) and (a.7) yield
Ji = Li[(θ + 1)fe]
−1. (a.8)
Substituting (a.8) into (a.5) yields expression (18) for the cutoﬀ productivity in the text, where the
terms in the summation that are particular to country j are emphasized for expositional purposes.


























(a.9) implicitly solves for the wage rate wi for each country i as a function of the remaining

















Zi(w) is the i-th contribution to the system of I equations that characterizes the equilibrium
wage vector. Equilibrium wages satisfy Zi(w) = 0 (∀i). It is straightforward to show that there
exists a unique equilibrium wage vector that satisﬁes the system equality, after setting one wi
to be a num´ eraire (see Alvarez and Lucas (2007)). The idea is to treat the system above as an
aggregate excess demand function of an exchange economy. For existence, it suﬃces to verify that
the system satisﬁes properties 1-5 listed in Proposition 17.B.2 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995), p. 581.
Existence follows from Proposition 17.C.1 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995), p. 585, which is essentially a
reference to Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem. For uniqueness, notice that the system has the gross
substitution property (diﬀerential version of Deﬁnition 17.F.2 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), p. 612),
∀i,k,k  = i,∂Zi(w)/∂wk > 0, and the result follows from Proposition 17.F.3 of Mas-Colell et al.
(1995), p. 613.
When gross substitution holds, comparative static exercises with respect to wages are straight-
forward. Let B ≡ {τij,Lj,bi,θ}i,j=1,...,I denote the set of relevant parameters. Then the equilib-
rium system can be written as Z(w;B). Let w∗ be the unique wage vector corresponding to B∗;
Z(w∗;B∗) = 0. WLOG, consider a positive productivity shock in country I, namely a rise in bI.








Since the system has the gross substitution property, Proposition 17.G.3 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995),
p. 618, ensures that [DwZ(w∗;B∗)]−1 has all its entries negative. Moreover, diﬀerentiation shows
that DBZ(w∗;B∗)dbI << 0 for the ﬁrst I − 1 countries (and therefore the sign is positive for
country I). Then, Dw(B∗)dbI << 0 for the ﬁrst I − 1 countries. Hence, a positive productivity
shock in I lowers the wages of all countries relative to I; or, it raises I’s relative wage. A more
detailed proof is beyond the scope of the paper and is available upon request.
A.3 Comparative Statics and Proofs of Propositions
In this section, I show how productivity thresholds vary with respect to destinations’ per-capita
incomes and sizes. I maintain the ceteris paribus assumption and I consider changes in one market
characteristic at a time, holding all other objects ﬁxed.
The analysis is in the spirit of Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009), who choose the parameters of
their model so that wages across countries are identical and ﬁxed, and per-capita income diﬀerences
reﬂect labor-eﬃciency diﬀerences. I conduct a similar exercise, however, I ﬁx eﬃciency levels and
consider changes in per-capita incomes that occur due to changes in wages.
Since prices are inversely related to thresholds, it is suﬃcient to show how thresholds change
with market characteristics and take the opposite sign.
















































































Clearly, the threshold is falling in the destination’s per-capita income and rising in the destination’s
size. From expression (11), the opposite must be true for the price of a variety.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider expression (22), which represents the price of variety φ from i in
destination j relative to k, k  = j. Since I can always relabel countries, without loss of generality,
consider an increase in wj, keeping wk ﬁxed. The goal is to show that ∂(pij(φ)/pik(φ))/∂wj > 0.
From (22), it suﬃces to show that ∂(φ∗
ij/φ∗
ik)/∂wj < 0.
33Using expression (18) for destination j and rewriting the sum in (18) for destination k so as to





































































































































































A suﬃcient condition for (a.11) to be strictly negative is that the term in the curly bracket is
non-negative. Since, by assumption τjj = 1 (∀j), the term in the curly bracket is non-negative
when trade barriers obey the triangle inequality, (∀j,k,υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider expression (22), which represents the price of variety φ from i in
destination j relative to k, k  = j. Since I can always relabel countries, without loss of generality,
consider an increase in Lj, keeping Lk ﬁxed. The goal is to show that ∂(pij(φ)/pik(φ))/∂Lj < 0.
From (22), it suﬃces to show that ∂(φ∗
ij/φ∗
ik)/∂Lj > 0.













































































A suﬃcient condition for (a.12) to be strictly positive is that the term in the curly bracket is
strictly positive. Since, by assumption τjj = 1 (∀j), the term in the curly bracket is strictly
positive when the trade barriers for j and k obey the triangle inequality, (∀υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk, and
when the inequality for at least one υ  = j is strict.
34B Appendix: Linear Demand in General Equilibrium
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium of a heterogeneous-ﬁrm model of international trade
with linear demand ` a la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). I assume that the market structure is
identical to the one in the main body of the paper, so I let per-capita income equal the wage rate.



































where η and α are positive parameters, and high values of α make the varieties less substitutable.
Taking the ratio of FOCs for a pair of varieties and integrating out νj yields individual demand
for qc






















υj (ω′)dω′ is an aggregate demand statistic for a consumer. In the above
expression, aggregate statistics Pj and Nj are deﬁned in (3) and (2), respectively. The total demand
from country j is simply the product of individual demand (b.1) and country size Lj.
After relabeling a variety by the productivity and the country of origin of the ﬁrm that produces



































Next, I modify the steps in Appendix A.2 to characterize the equilibrium in the present model.




















To solve the model, it is necessary to jointly determine wages, wi, and measures of entrants, Ji,
∀i. The system of equilibrium equations consists of a free entry condition and an income/spending














The income/spending identity requires that country i’s consumers spend their entire income on















Expressions (b.6) and (b.7) yield
Ji = Li[(θ + 1)fe]
−1. (b.8)











Finally, to characterize wages, ﬁrst derive import shares, which are identical to the model in the




j Tji, substitute them

















(b.10) implicitly solves for the wage rate wi for each country i as a function of the remaining
countries’ wages.
It is straightforward to verify that the price of a variety is increasing in a destination’s per-
capita income and falling in a destination’s market size. From the pricing rule in (b.4), notice that
it is suﬃcient to examine how productivity cutoﬀs vary with destination-speciﬁc characteristics.















































Thresholds are falling in the per-capita income and rising in the size of the destination, so the
opposite is true of the price of a variety. However, since prices feature additive mark-ups, it is not
trivial to determine how the relative price of an identical variety behaves across countries.
C Appendix: Destination-Speciﬁc Sales Taxes
C.1 Robust Tests of Alternative Models
In this section, I demonstrate that cross-country variations in sales taxes are not a source of bias
in the empirical tests of the three models discussed in the main body of the paper. I augment the
econometric model in (23) by log[(1 + vatj)/(1 + vats)], where vatj (vats) is the percentage sales
tax on apparel in j (Spain). I denote the coeﬃcient for this variable by ˆ γvat in Table 6. Clearly,
diﬀerences in sales taxes are not responsible for the systematic behavior of prices across countries,
as the estimates for ˆ γvat are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Table 6: Robust Test of Alternative Models (Sales Taxes), 18 Countries
Exchange (ˆ γw (ˆ γL (ˆ γc,1 (ˆ γc,2 (ˆ γc,3 (ˆ γc,4 (ˆ γvat
Rate (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0691** -0.0257* (0.0052 (0.2082*** (0.2582*** (0.2193*** -0.2455
(0.0314) (0.0137) (0.0396) (0.0175) (0.0249) (0.0569) (0.4971)
Feb/Aug (0.0712** -0.0236* -0.0001 (0.2054*** (0.2515*** (0.2168*** -0.0712
(0.0304) (0.0137) (0.0398) (0.0179) (0.0255) (0.0574) (0.4894)
Jan/Jul (0.0647** -0.0225 -0.0014 (0.2076*** (0.2549*** (0.2186*** -0.0629
(0.0304) (0.0140) (0.0401) (0.0178) (0.0259) (0.0579) (0.4901)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** signiﬁcance at 5%-level, *** signiﬁcance at 1%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire), Fixed Eﬀects 179 (relative to good 1)
Distance Intervals (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance from CEPII. Nominal per-capita GDP and population for 2007 from WDI. Apparel VAT from European
Commission.
37C.2 Model With Destination-Speciﬁc Sales Taxes
Suppose that the consumer in destination j pays a sales tax vatj > 0. Let κj ≡ 1 + vatj be the
gross sales tax. The maximization problem of a consumer in j, potentially buying varieties from























Following the solution algorithm outlined in the text, one obtains the following relative pricing











































βτ βw βλ βκ
The pricing rule is augmented by a fourth object, which captures relative sales taxes.
I derive an econometric model from the pricing rule above and I estimate the coeﬃcients using
the two methodologies outlined in the text. I consider the benchmark trade-barrier speciﬁcation
in expression (28). The results from the estimation of the model augmented by gross sales taxes,
expressed relative to Spain’s tax, are reported in Tables 7 and 8. The coeﬃcients on per-capita
income are virtually unchanged relative to the benchmark estimates. Furthermore, the coeﬃcients
on sales taxes are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Thus, it cannot be concluded that sales
taxes have any systematic eﬀect on prices.
Table 7: Estimation With Error-Adjusted Trade Barriers and VAT, 18 Countries
Exchange Rate (ˆ βw ( ˆ βλ (ˆ βτ (ˆ βκ
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0587* -0.0214 (0.0392** -0.4122
(0.0322) (0.0248) (0.0191) (0.2548)
Feb/Aug (0.0616* -0.0205 (0.0389** -0.2475
(0.0308) (0.0245) (0.0189) (0.2426)
Jan/Jul (0.0573* -0.0230 (0.0370* -0.2379
(0.0313) (0.0251) (0.0193) (0.2443)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** signiﬁcance at 5% level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire).
Distance Intervals for Gravity (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953], (2953,max]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance from CEPII. Bilateral trade and gross output for “Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear”
industry for 2006 from Stats.OECD. Apparel VAT from European Commission.









(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
99.89 (0.5691*** (0.0082 (0.0060 (0.9161
(0.0418) (0.0503) (0.0411) (1.5691)
Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Regression
Exchange Rate (ˆ βw ( ˆ βλ (ˆ βτ (ˆ βκ
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0601*** -0.0545* (0.0134 -0.3201
(0.0251) (0.0334) (0.0267) (0.4136)
Feb/Aug (0.0632*** -0.0537* (0.0131 -0.1538
(0.0243) (0.0336) (0.0269) (0.3985)
Jan/Jul (0.0575*** -0.0538 (0.0131 -0.1532
(0.0243) (0.0337) (0.0271) (0.3931)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, *** signiﬁcance at 1%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire).
Distance Intervals for Gravity (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953], (2953,max]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance from CEPII. Bilateral trade, gross output, value added (in volumes), and number of persons employed
for “Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear” industry for 2006 from Stats.OECD. Apparel VAT from
European Commission.
D Appendix: Supplementary Tables
Table 9: Trade-Barrier Measurement Error and Per-Capita Income
Trade-Barrier Log Per-Capita Income Constant R-squared #Obs
Speciﬁcation (s.e.) (s.e.)
Benchmark (28) -0.6446 (0.0535 0.1966 17
(0.3365) (0.1711)
Alternative (30) -0.6989 (0.0580 0.2600 17
(0.3044) (0.1548)
Table 10: Per-Capita Income and Price of Tradables, ICP 2005
Basic Headings Log Per-Capita Income Constant R-squared
(s.e.) (s.e.)
Tradables (0.3361 (0.0680 0.9117
(0.0261) (0.0129)
Apparel, Footwear, (0.1700 -0.0127 0.4841
and Accessories (0.0439) (0.0217)
39Table 11: Benchmark Gravity Estimates and Summary Statistics, 18 Countries
Exporter ˆ Si S.E. Importer ˆ Sj S.E. Distance −θ ˆ dk S.E.
Austria 1.2669 0.3220 Austria −0.8595 0.2183 [0,501] −2.6474 0.1510
Belgium 2.3998 0.3219 Belgium −1.1046 0.2183 (501,1367] −4.1112 0.0962
Estonia −1.4263 0.3218 Estonia −0.6516 0.2183 (1367,1482] −4.3786 0.1816
Finland −0.3959 0.3314 Finland −0.7564 0.2218 (1482,2953] −5.0042 0.0965
France 0.8026 0.3188 France 0.7302 0.2172 (2953,max] −5.4053 0.4308
Germany 2.6148 0.3248 Germany −0.1371 0.2194
Greece −0.6956 0.3266 Greece 0.4817 0.2201
Hungary −0.7645 0.3177 Hungary 0.0859 0.2168
Ireland −1.6676 0.3181 Ireland −0.3286 0.2169
Italy 1.1214 0.3163 Italy 1.8463 0.2163
Norway −2.2828 0.3151 Norway −0.9115 0.2158
Portugal 0.3171 0.3748 Portugal 1.1163 0.2385
Slovakia −1.3603 0.3200 Slovakia 0.2139 0.2176 Summary Statistics
Slovenia −2.6471 0.3172 Slovenia 0.9723 0.2166 No. Obs 306
Spain 0.3151 0.3165 Spain 1.2501 0.2163 TSS 1588
Sweden 1.3180 0.3165 Sweden −1.5318 0.2163 SSR 221
Switzerland 0.5571 0.3165 Switzerland −0.8855 0.2163 σ2 0.8293
United Kingdom 0.5271 0.3189 United Kingdom 0.4699 0.2172 R-squared 0.8606
Exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcients satisfy
 
i ˆ Si = 0 and
 
j ˆ Sj = 0, respectively.
Table 12: Alternative Gravity Estimates and Summary Statistics, 18 Countries
Exporter ˆ Si S.E. Importer ˆ Sj S.E. Distance −θ ˆ dk S.E.
Austria 2.1534 0.5007 Austria −1.3027 0.2864 [0,501] −3.8867 0.3027
Belgium 2.1425 0.3576 Belgium −0.9992 0.2234 (501,1367] −4.7033 0.1876
Estonia −1.6300 0.3327 Estonia −0.5730 0.2144 (1367,1482] −4.8888 0.2406
Finland −0.7262 0.3357 Finland −0.6145 0.2155 (1482,2953] −5.4765 0.2003
France 0.3808 0.3209 France 0.9179 0.2101 (2953,max] −5.8567 0.4675
Germany 2.2640 0.3534 Germany 0.0151 0.2217
Greece −1.1644 0.3463 Greece 0.6929 0.2194 Border 0.6215 0.2345
Hungary 0.2682 0.5072 Hungary −0.4304 0.2892 Coastal Access 0.8361 0.3333
Ireland −1.9195 0.3358 Ireland −0.2258 0.2150 Common Language -0.0088 0.2751
Italy 0.5035 0.3295 Italy 2.1321 0.2130 Common Origin 0.3855 0.1623
Norway −2.6121 0.3299 Norway −0.7701 0.2129
Portugal −0.2114 0.3805 Portugal 1.3573 0.2339
Slovakia −0.2248 0.5013 Slovakia −0.3539 0.2866 Summary Statistics
Slovenia −1.5477 0.5182 Slovenia 0.4227 0.2940 No. Obs 306
Spain −0.2036 0.3277 Spain 1.4863 0.2124 TSS 1588
Sweden 1.1293 0.3222 Sweden −1.4606 0.2104 SSR 194
Switzerland 0.8110 0.3325 Switzerland −0.7106 0.2283 σ2 0.7364
United Kingdom 0.5871 0.3363 United Kingdom 0.4166 0.2155 R-squared 0.8781
Exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcients satisfy
 
i ˆ Si = 0 and
 
j ˆ Sj = 0, respectively.
40Table 13: Alternative Estimation With Error-Adjusted Trade Barriers, 18 Countries
Exchange Rate (ˆ βw ( ˆ βλ (ˆ βτ
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0671** -0.0118 (0.0462***
(0.0279) (0.0181) (0.0147)
Feb/Aug (0.0701*** -0.0095 (0.0482***
(0.0261) (0.0176) (0.0144)
Jan/Jul (0.0652** -0.0111 (0.0470***
(0.0264) (0.0179) (0.0145)
** signiﬁcance at 5% level, *** signiﬁcance at 1%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire).
Distance Intervals for Gravity (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953], (2953,max]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance, border, language, and origin from CEPII. Bilateral trade and gross output for “Textiles, textile
products, leather and footwear” industry for 2006 from Stats.OECD.









112.44 (0.5823*** (0.0393 (0.0379
(0.0481) (0.0454) (0.0395)
Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Regression
Exchange Rate (ˆ βw ( ˆ βλ (ˆ βτ
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0732*** -0.0389* (0.0244
(0.0261) (0.0226) (0.0185)
Feb/Aug (0.0776*** -0.0366* (0.0264
(0.0255) (0.0223) (0.0185)
Jan/Jul (0.0722*** -0.0362* (0.0268
(0.0249) (0.0222) (0.0185)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, *** signiﬁcance at 1%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire).
Distance Intervals for Gravity (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953], (2953,max]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance, border, language, and origin from CEPII. Bilateral trade, gross output, value added (in volumes),
and number of persons employed for “Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear” industry for 2006 from
Stats.OECD.
41Web Appendix for “Income Diﬀerences and Prices of Tradables”
Alternative Test of Non-Homothetic and Ideal-Variety Models
In this section, I derive two predictions of the model introduced in this paper and I describe how
they relate to the predictions of Hummels and Lugovskyy’s (2009) ideal-variety model. I then test
these predictions using the price data described in the main text.
To begin, the ideal-variety model predicts that the relative price of a variety is higher in markets
with relatively higher per-capita incomes, after controlling for relative incomes. Intuitively, when
one controls for total income—the product of per-capita income and market size—one disentangles
the ﬁnickiness eﬀect, which positively links prices to per-capita income, from the pro-competitive
eﬀect, which negatively links prices to market income. Since, overall, the model yields a negative
relationship between relative prices and relative per-capita incomes, it must be the case that the
model predicts that the (positive) elasticity of relative prices with respect to relative per-capita
incomes falls short of the (negative) elasticity of relative prices with respect to relative incomes.
In order to understand how relative prices relate to relative incomes in the present model, it is
suﬃcient to examine how relative thresholds vary. Multiplying and dividing the ﬁrst term in the



























Consider an increase in the income of destination j, Yj, for a given level of per-capita income, wj.



































The productivity threshold in (d.1) rises, thus lowering the mark-up in (11). Clearly, when one
controls for a country’s per-capita income, a rise in income must be driven by a rise in the country’s
population, which lowers the price of a variety.
Conversely, keep the total income ﬁxed, and consider a rise in per-capita income. Diﬀerentiating
















































1The productivity threshold in (d.1) falls, thus raising the mark-up in (11).
Finally, one can verify that the sum of the elasticities of thresholds with respect to per-capita
income, wj, and total income, Yj, is negative. Using (d.2) and (d.1), the elasticity of φ∗
ij with































  > 0. (d.4)
Using (d.3), (d.1), and (d.4), the elasticity of φ∗







































































Clearly, the sum of the elasticity of the threshold with respect to per-capita income and the
elasticity of the threshold with respect to income is negative. Thus, in (11), the positive eﬀects of
per-capita income on prices dominate the negative eﬀects caused by higher income.
A similar intuition applies to the relationship between relative prices and relative incomes of
destinations, controlling for relative per-capita incomes. Proposition 3 summarizes the result.
Proposition 3. For any two countries, j and k, j  = k, if trade barriers obey the triangle inequality,
(∀υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk, and if the inequality for at least one υ  = j is strict, then the relative price of a
variety sold in markets j and k is strictly decreasing in the relative incomes of the markets, after
controlling for the markets’ relative per-capita incomes.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider expression (22), which represents the price of variety φ from i in
destination j relative to k, k  = j. Since I can always relabel countries, without loss of generality,
consider an increase in Yj, keeping wj, and wk and Lk (therefore also Yk) ﬁxed. The goal is to
show that ∂(pij(φ)/pik(φ))/∂Yj < 0. From (22), it suﬃces to show that ∂(φ∗
ij/φ∗
ik)/∂Yj > 0.
Using expression (d.1) for destination j and rewriting the sum in (d.1) for destination k so as






















































































































A suﬃcient condition for (d.6) to be strictly positive is that the term in the curly bracket is strictly
positive. Since, by assumption τjj = 1 (∀j), the term in the curly bracket is strictly positive when
the trade barriers for j and k obey the triangle inequality, (∀υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk, and when the inequality
for at least one υ  = j is strict.
Finally, Proposition 4 states the conditions under which the positive eﬀect of relative per-capita
income dominates the negative eﬀect of relative income on relative prices. For a pair of countries,
j and k, j  = k, let ζY j,k denote the elasticity of the relative price of any variety between j and k
with respect to the relative incomes between j and k. Similarly, let ζwj,k denote the elasticity of
the relative price between j and k with respect to the relative per-capita incomes of the markets.
Proposition 4. If trade barriers obey the triangle inequality, (∀j,k,υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk, then the relative
price of a variety sold in two markets is strictly increasing in the relative per-capita incomes of the
markets, after controlling for the markets’ relative incomes. If in addition θ ≥ 1, then for any two
countries, j and k, j  = k, ζY j,k + ζwj,k > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider expression (22), which represents the price of variety φ from i in
destination j relative to k, k  = j. Since I can always relabel countries, without loss of generality,
consider an increase in wj, keeping Yj, and wk and Lk (therefore also Yk) ﬁxed. The goal is to
show that ∂(pij(φ)/pik(φ))/∂wj > 0. From (22), it suﬃces to show that ∂(φ∗
ij/φ∗
ik)/∂wj < 0.




















































































































3A suﬃcient condition for (d.7) to be strictly negative is that the term in the curly bracket is non-
negative. Since, by assumption τjj = 1 (∀j), the term in the curly bracket is non-negative when
trade barriers obey the triangle inequality, (∀j,k,υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk.
Finally, from (22), notice that, in order to determine the sign of the sum of the elasticities of
relative prices with respect to relative incomes and relative per-capita incomes, ζY j,k + ζwj,k, it is
suﬃcient to compute the negative of the sum of the elasticities of relative thresholds with respect to
the same variables. Denote the elasticities of thresholds by χY j,k and χwj,k. To derive the elasticity




































































Similarly, to derive the elasticity of relative thresholds with respect to relative per-capita incomes,



































































































































































































  . (d.9)
Finally, using (d.9), the sum of the two elasticities is



































































By assumption, τjj = 1 (∀j) and trade barriers obey the triangle inequality, (∀j,k,υ)τυjτjk ≥ τυk.
Hence, χY j,k ≥ 0. A suﬃcient condition for the sum to be strictly negative is that θ ≥ 1.
In order to test the two predictions of the models, I use a variant of the econometric model
















+ ˆ γcc + ξjm. (d.10)
Expression (d.10) is similar to the econometric model that I use to test the predictions of the
three competing theories in the main text. The new variable is Yj/Ys, which represents country j’s
income, relative to Spain’s, with ˆ γY being the corresponding coeﬃcient. Thus, rather than using
relative country sizes, I use relative incomes in the present test. This is exactly the speciﬁcation
that Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) use in order to test their model. Since the authors use f.o.b.
unit values to proxy the prices of varieties, they do not control for shipping costs in the analysis.
A positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimate of ˆ γw and a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
estimate of ˆ γY are in line with the predictions of either model. However, a positive sum of the
estimates of ˆ γw and ˆ γY provides support for the non-homothetic model only.
The results from the test of the ideal-variety versus the non-homothetic model are reported
in Table 15. The coeﬃcients are estimated via OLS and the standard errors are clustered by
country. The ﬁrst set of estimates uses the benchmark trade-barrier speciﬁcation, which depends
on distance intervals only. The second set expands the trade-barrier speciﬁcation to accommodate
the “island” eﬀect, while the third controls for sales tax variations across countries.
The coeﬃcient estimates on per-capita income are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, while
the coeﬃcients on total income are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings are in
line with Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009), who estimate a similar econometric model using unit-
value data collected at the port of shipping to approximate prices of varieties from eleven source
countries sold in two-hundred destinations over the 1990-2003 period.
However, the sum of the estimated coeﬃcients on per-capita and total income in Table 15 is
positive—an empirical ﬁnding that is also documented by Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009). This
result supports the non-homothetic over the ideal-variety model which predicts a negative sum.
The last result should be interpreted with caution. While testing the signs and signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcient estimates is reasonable in a non-structural econometric model, comparing the
magnitudes of the elasticities is not as straightforward. Since the econometric model is not a
structural equation obtained from either theoretical model, it is not clear whether the magnitudes
of the elasticities are meaningful. It is for this reason that I derive a structural equation from the
non-homothetic model in the main body and I use it in order to estimate the elasticity of price
with respect to per-capita income and to interpret the parameter’s magnitude.
5Table 15: Alternative Test of Non-Homothetic VS. Ideal-Variety Model, 18 Countries
Exchange (ˆ γw (ˆ γY (ˆ γc,1 (ˆ γc,2 (ˆ γc,3 (ˆ γc,4 (ˆ γisl
Rate (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0928*** -0.0282** -0.0105 (0.2064*** (0.2497*** (0.2036*** —
Distance (0.0333) (0.0126) (0.0226) (0.0180) (0.0141) (0.0383) —
Feb/Aug (0.0943*** -0.0243** -0.0046 (0.2049*** (0.2491*** (0.2122*** —
Distance (0.0324) (0.0118) (0.0221) (0.0173) (0.0143) (0.0384) —
Jan/Jul (0.0867** -0.0232* -0.0054 (0.2071*** (0.2527*** (0.2146*** —
Distance (0.0329) (0.0120) (0.0221) (0.0172) (0.0153) (0.0388) —
Mar/Sep (0.0938*** -0.0286** -0.0109 (0.2077*** (0.2533*** (0.2027*** -0.0083
Distance/Island (0.0347) (0.0133) (0.0230) (0.0204) (0.0113) (0.0395) (0.0204)
Feb/Aug (0.0932*** -0.0239* -0.0041 (0.2035*** (0.2452*** (0.2132*** 0.0092
Distance/Island (0.0337) (0.0124) (0.0220) (0.0185) (0.0112) (0.0394) (0.0173)
Jan/Jul (0.0851** -0.0225* -0.0048 (0.2051*** (0.2471*** (0.2160*** 0.0132
Distance/Island (0.0343) (0.0127) (0.0220) (0.0181) (0.0115) (0.0398) (0.0175)
Exchange (ˆ γw (ˆ γY (ˆ γc,1 (ˆ γc,2 (ˆ γc,3 (ˆ γc,4 (ˆ γvat
Rate (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mar/Sep (0.0949*** -0.0257* (0.0051 (0.2082*** (0.2582*** (0.2192*** -0.2448
Distance/VAT (0.0323) (0.0137) (0.0396) (0.0175) (0.0249) (0.0569) (0.4973)
Feb/Aug (0.0949*** -0.0236* -0.0001 (0.2054*** (0.2515*** (0.2168*** -0.0706
Distance/VAT (0.0316) (0.0137) (0.0398) (0.0179) (0.0255) (0.0574) (0.4895)
Jan/Jul (0.0872** -0.0225 (0.0015 (0.2076*** (0.2549*** (0.2185*** -0.0623
Distance/VAT (0.0322) (0.0140) (0.0401) (0.0178) (0.0259) (0.0579) (0.4903)
* signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** signiﬁcance at 5%-level, *** signiﬁcance at 1%-level
Price regressions: N. Obs 3060, Country clusters 17 (Spain is num´ eraire), Fixed Eﬀects 179 (relative to good 1)
Distance Intervals (in km): [0,501], (501,1367], (1367,1482], (1482,2953]
Data Sources: Prices from Mar/Sep 2008 online catalogues of clothing manufacturer Mango. Exchange rates
for Mar/Sep, Aug/Feb, and Jan/Jul 2008 from ECB. DHL Express shipping zones from DHL Spain Online.
Distance from CEPII. Nominal per-capita GDP and nominal GDP for 2007 from WDI. Apparel VAT from
European Commission.
6